Exciting research — incredible work as always. I think your proposals and paper improve the model that all chains today use, socially speaking. Balanced/fair costs between transactors and miners. A smoother ride for all.
I don’t think it makes a lot of sense to transition a chain from an ‘auction’ fee-selection system to a sliding one — it could cause a contentious fork / more trouble than good.
Fee estimation algorithms being ‘hard’ is sorta a scapegoat, since they don’t incur a heavy time cost (only once every 10 / 2.5 minutes, only for the miner, for all miners). If the transactors are the ones experiencing the cost inefficiency, then they just need to bid smarter (low fee, and wait a while).
> This clearly creates many inefficiencies, because it’s absurd to suggest that the cost incurred by the network from accepting one more transaction into a block actually is 100x more when gas prices are 200 gwei than when they are 2 gwei; in both cases, it’s a difference between 8 million gas and 8.02 million gas.
I’m unconvinced that this is an inefficiency and not an effect; the condition of whether an additional tx is allowed is all-or-none (whether it fits), for-the-next-block. The selection of ‘best’ via maximizing the fees is a memoryless, miner-only activity. For an equal sized transaction, under different user weather, indeed the mining conditions are that much different. It is not as much an outrageous cost to the spender, as it is a freebie for the miner. The network never has any ‘costs’, besides its (free) intermittent coinbase payouts; its integrity would be destroyed though if it were to allow that marginal transaction.
The improvements to the social economics look worthwhile, but probably only work in practice on a new blockchain. It’d be a speculative play to hardfork with the post-21m or volatility conditions in mind.
I wonder what the Zcash team thinks about all this 🤔
Thank you for the citations!